A controversial video has now been leaked in which the head of the Revolutionary Guards confirms that his organization intervened in those elections, because they didn’t like the impending result. So the opposition was right, the 2009 elections were rigged.

My latest article looks at the implications of this new video. Please share with family and friends.

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/iran-irgc-2009-elections-violations-leaked-video-reformists.html

Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei made a mistake by choosing and backing Ahmadinejad in the 2009 elections.

Based on his goals, challenges and experiences, my latest article explains the criteria which he is likely to use to choose Iran’s next president.

 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/iran-presidential-elections-khamenei-candidates.html

The piece below analyzes these important questions:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/may/06/iran-ahmadinejad-mahdi

The article below by Meir Javedanfar, published in the Guardian explains more:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/apr/22/ahmadinejad-holocaust-racism

29/03/2009

Sometimes news takes time to get out of Iran — particularly when it comes to internal strife in the upper political echelons. But eventually, major clashes leak out. This week the news emerged that Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the mayor of Tehran and Ahmadinejad’s main rival in the Osulgarayn (Principalist) movement, resigned from his post just before the end of the previous Persian calendar year — approximately March 18 or 19.

A number of days later, he was reinstated to his job after his resignation was rejected by senior officials, most likely the supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei.

The news was first published in the Tehran-based Jahan News, which is affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Information and Security, known by its Farsi acronym as VAVAK.

According to the report, the main reason for Ghalibaf’s resignation was the termination of supply of cement, primary materials, and tools required by the Tehran municipality for its subway project for the city of Tehran. This follows another controversial decision by the government to cut subsidized gasoline provided to the municipality’s cars. This decision forced the organization to purchase gas at market prices — six or seven times the price. These decisions first caused a number of senior municipality managers to resign, followed by the mayor himself.

The very fact that he took a step as extreme as resigning from his post is an indication of the intensity of the rivalry between him and Ahmadinejad. As mayor of Tehran, Ghalibaf depends on the national government, and Ministry of Interior in particular, to supply him with material and subsidized goods for city projects. He can’t just simply go out and buy them himself.

According to government regulations, the Ministry of Interior must approve every purchase and, in many cases, supply the goods as well as the funds. As president, Ahmadinejad wields power over the Ministry of Interior and other ministries that deal with Tehran Municipality. With such power, he can make life as easy and as difficult for Ghalibaf as he chooses.

Since 2005, Ahmadinejad has decided to do the latter.

Numerous projects have been delayed. A notable one was the supply of buses to the municipality for its Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) scheme, which Ghalibaf has been championing as a solution to Tehran’s traffic problems since late 2005. This notwithstanding the $600 million of approved funds, which the government refused to release to the municipality.  Recently, Ghalibaf hit back, removing posters celebrating the 100th anniversary of the country’s oil industry, which showed Ahmadinejad standing in front of a refinery.

Ahmadinejad’s perception of Ghalibaf as a threat is quite accurate. There are many within the Iranian conservative movement who are concerned about the damage Ahmadinejad and his disastrous economic policies have caused their movement. They see Ghalibaf and his support for more moderate foreign and economic policies as hope for redemption.

There is also Ghalibaf’s military record as well, far more distinguished than that of Ahmadinejad. Ghalibaf was a senior commander in the Revolutionary Guards, and unlike Ahmadinejad, he has lost family (his brother) in war.

The resignation of Khatami also seems to have boosted Ghalibaf’s position. Some of Khatami’s supporters now back Mousavi (Khatami’s replacement). According to Shafaf News from Tehran, more than half of Khatami’s supporters now back Ghalibaf. One of the main reasons is thought to be because they see Ghalibaf as a good prospect, due to his good relations with the Revolutionary Guards and Khamenei himself.

Judging by Khatami’s resignation and Ghalibaf’s temporary resignation, the level of discord within the Iranian government is reaching a new level, and Ayatollah Khamenei knows this. This is why Khatami was most probably advised not to run: because the animosity which he creates between the conservatives would have created more division and infighting.

Ghalibaf’s resignation would have been another embarrassing blow, as he could have become the second senior official (after Larijani) to resign because of Ahmadinejad — hence the successful pressure on him to reverse his decision.

These developments show that President Obama’s policy of refusing to negotiate with Iran until after the presidential elections is on target. Once the elections are over and the dust settles, Washington will be in a much better position to deal with Tehran. Waiting until then will not be an easy decision, especially economically. According to a recent study by the CATO Institute, oil prices are set to rise again, which could force Americans to pay $3 or $4 for their gasoline at the pump.

This will provide Iran’s political hierarchy with more leverage at the negotiations.

However, negotiating before the elections could bolster Ahmadinejad and weaken the people of Iran, as well as politicians such as Ghalibaf who oppose the president. This must be avoided.

Hopefully, the political divisions and the internal enemies Ahmadinejad has created may do a much better job of bringing him down than the U.S. or Israel ever could.

This article originally appeared in PJM Media

Since becoming president in 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has become one of the most widely known Iranian politicians. In direct contrast, his wife has been one of the most discreet spouses in Iranian political history. The world got its first glimpse of her in 2005, after she accompanied her husband on a trip to Malaysia. However, she did not speak any words and has hardly ever appeared in front of cameras since then. What was even more mysterious was her identity. She was only referred to as Mrs. Ahmadinejad in the very few reports which mentioned her. Her real identity was strongly protected.

But on January 18, 2009, the world suddenly met Azam Al Sadat Farahi, who until that day was known as Mrs. Ahmadinejad. The encounter was brought about by a letter she wrote on behalf of Gazans to Suzanne Mubarak, the wife of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. In it she wrote:

The people of Gaza have been subjected to aerial, ground and sea attacks and have been living under siege for a long time. Witnessing the bombardment of mosques, hospitals and houses and the mutilation of women and children brings pain to the heart of any human being. …I ask you to do whatever is in your capacity to help the people of Gaza and to help them from the oppression that they are suffering from, so that your name is placed alongside the name of worthy and peace seeking women.

One could doubt whether Mrs. Ahmadinejad’s letter would have any impact, because these days Egypt is trying its best to isolate Iran. This was seen by the fact that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei on several occasions asked for Mubarak’s help. Nothing ever came of it.

Nevertheless, the symbolic value of the letter should not be ignored. Many people around the world believe that Iranian women, especially conservative ones, are confined to the boundaries of the kitchen. This may be true about wives of conservative clergy. However when it comes to non-clergy conservatives, the opposite is true. Quite a few are very vociferous in their political thinking and beliefs.

One of the most notable is Fatemeh Rajabi, the journalist wife of Gholam Hossein Elham, a government spokesman and one of Ahmadinejad’s most trusted confidants. Rajabi sometimes appears in the press more often than her husband. Furthermore, she has openly attacked Rafsanjani’s allies for being corrupt and Ayatollah Khatami for being too liberal and friendly toward the West. She even called for the defrocking of  Khatami. Although many male members of Iran’s political elite have done the same, Rajabi is the first female critic in Iran’s post-revolution history to go so far in her criticism of senior politicians. This has earned her several nicknames. One is “Fatti Arreh,” meaning “Fatemeh the hacksaw.” The other is “Shamsi Pahlevoon,” a nickname given to physically rough women in Iran.

Despite the fact that Ahmadinejad’s wife has been camera shy until recently, she too has had a strong influence on her husband. Although the president of Iran is no feminist, compared to other conservatives in Iran he has championed more rights for women. One of them was his public call to allow women to attend soccer matches as spectators. Soon after, he was subjected to fierce criticism from senior clergy from the city of Qom because they saw it as un-Islamic. Ahmadinejad did not back down until he was forced to by Iran’s supreme leader. Furthermore, during his tenure as mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad opened many leisure areas for women, including parks and libraries. Although segregation of men and women is frowned upon in the West and by many Iranians, it must be noted that some women in Iran welcome segregation in buses and parks due to problems such as unwanted physical contact and approach by strangers. Right-wing movements have also increased their recruitment of women for their campaigning and demonstrations. A great number of Baseej (people’s militia) who demonstrated against Israel and Egypt were women.

As the Iranian presidential elections near, we are going to hear more from the female members of Iran’s political arena. Their appearance is not solely for the betterment of human kind. Jealousy and self-interest are also at play. It is believed that one of the reasons why Ahmadinejad’s wife wrote to Suzanne Mubarak is because she did not want to be outdone by Zohre Sadeghi, the wife of Ayatollah Khatami (Ahmadinejad’s chief rival), who two days earlier had written a similar letter to the wife of the emir of Qatar.

Conservative clergy may wish to keep Iran’s women quiet and at home. However, it looks like the conservative non-clergy politicians who should back them are actually turning against them.

Sixty percent of Iran’s university graduates are women. It’s only a matter of time before they can slowly claim their deserved place in the government and society of their country.

This article originally appeared in PJM Media

22/01/2009

The period leading to the Iranian presidential elections is always exciting, and this time it will be no different.

According to a recent article in the Tehran based Baztab online, members of a parallel intelligence agency inside Iran have been arrested after being caught spying on Tehran Mayor and presidential candidate Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. The arrested group was collecting information about Ghalibaf’s meetings and electioneering gatherings.

In an interesting twist to the story, the head of the counter intelligence agency that caught the group was later removed because he supplied the information to the press.

The report does not mention who were the people spying on Ghalibaf. However one can assume that the person who has the most to lose from Ghalibaf’s participation in the elections is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He may feel safe about Ayatollah Khatami’s participation, because he could assume that Ayatollah Khamenei, who is not usually in favor of reformists, may not allow him to win.

However Ghalibaf who is from within the conservative movement may pose a bigger danger. Unlike Ahmadinejad, he was a senior commander in the Revolutionary Guards, and fought in the war for the entire eight years. This is in contrast to Ahmadinejad’s one and half years on the front lines. Also, Ghalibaf is the brother of a Shaheed (martyr), whereas Ahmadinejad did not lose any close family in the war. These factors reinforce Ghalibaf’s revolutionary credentials and give him an edge over the president. 

Furthermore, Ghalibaf is seen as more moderating force in terms of economic and foreign policy. He has openly spoken out against excessive spending and populist policies of the current government, while calling for a more moderate foreign policy and investment from abroad. This is music to the ears of many conservative supporters, and those who want to support Khatami, but believe that despite his good intentions, Khamenei will never let him win.

There are two other factors which boost Ghalibaf’s chances.

One is Ali Larijani’s decision not to participate. His participation may have led to cannibalization of votes between the two.

The other is election of Barack Obama. His calls for unconditional dialogue have been heard in Tehran. So have recommendations for him not to meet with Ahmadinejad.

It is very possible that the Supreme Leader may decide that Ahmadinejad’s catastrophic economic performance and his foreign policy stance may have cost Iran too much. That his removal may be worth the price for the sake of internal stability, and the chance to reap the benefits of dialogue with the US.

Between all the candidates, Ghalibaf would be the best face saving choice. His election as a conservative candidate would allow Khamenei to choose a middle course which would satisfy conservatives at home and those wanting to approach a more moderate Iran.

This well written piece by the Wall Street Journal offers one perspective.

To read click here