http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/09/01/iran_lobbying_schmoozing_scheming_97115.html
Next article – Hariri’s Hezbollah Decision Could Benefit Israelhttp://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2009/09/hariris_hezbollah_decision_cou.html
]]>Can he? The piece below explores:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/30/iran-khamenei-rafsanjani-clerics
]]>Taking into consideration the current events in Iran, what are Khamenei’s choices?
The interview hosted by ABC of Australia, together with Simon Tisdall of The Guardian, tries to look at his options.
To listen, click below
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/saturdayextra/stories/2009/2603323.htm
Khamenei’s Speech: Learning From the Shah?
What are the historic dimensions of Khamenei’s strategy?
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/meir-javedanfar/khameneis-speech-learning_b_218094.html
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rent events in Iran do not only impact domestic policy, they also have regional ramifications.
To read about them and the internal dynamics of current events, click below
http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2009/06/world_record_iran_edition.html
]]>http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3073
Full video
http://www.realclearworld.com/video/2009/06/10/rcw_iranian_elections_panel.html
]]>http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/06/a_silent_revolution_in_iran.html
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Judging by the platforms of the three candidates presently approved to challenge Ahmadinejad in the June 12 presidential elections, they all wish to improve Iran’s relations with the West.
Why? Three reasons demonstrate their motivations.
First is Barack Obama. His Nowruz (Iranian new year) message to the people of Iran and his popularity in the international arena has impacted domestic Iranian politics, without Obama making an overt statement such as a candidate endorsement. The majority of candidates see this as an opportunity, including Mohsen Rezai.
The former head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC), Rezai is currently sought by INTERPOL for his involvement in the 1994 AMIA bombing in Argentina. Despite his murky past, Rezai — who sees himself as a pragmatic — is standing for election. In a recent interview with the German newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau, Rezai stated that “current changes in American foreign policy must be taken seriously.” The change he sees includes “America’s lack of interest to send its armies around the world.”
In other words, unlike Bush, Obama is not interested in the invasion of other countries — including Iran. Rezai is interested in cooperating with the U.S. on issues such as illicit drugs, peace and stability in the Near and Middle East, and the global economic crisis.
When it comes to Israel, Rezai — who referred to Imad Mughniya, the assassinated head of Hezbollah’s armed forces, as his friend — believes that the best way to prevent an Israeli attack is to build an international nuclear fuel consortium on Iranian soil. Such a group would include the U.S. itself, as well as Russia and the E.U. He believes that with such countries as stakeholders, Israel would be unlikely to attack.
Rezai also states that “the people of Palestine should determine their own destiny.”
Domestic politics also fuel the drive for improved relations with the West, according to reformists Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. These politicians have witnessed how U.S. relations and Holocaust issues have been hijacked by Ahmadinejad and his supporters. What worries them is that he has been using such issues to his advantage by isolating Iran. They know that Ahmadinejad and his radical partners thrive in isolation, using it to stifle domestic opposition. Isolation and confrontation with the international community also give Ahmadinejad an opportunity to implement policy with little concern for other voices. Over the last four years, the opposition has suffered under isolation and now wishes to put an end to it. They want to reclaim their stature within Iranian politics, and bringing Iran out of isolation is a means towards that end.
The opposition candidates are also worried about the future, even if they are not elected. Rezai said Ahemadinejad’s reelection could “throw the country into the abyss.” This could be interpreted as meaning that the regime itself could be endangered.
Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy is not the only cause of concern. His economic policies have caused huge damage, increasing Iran’s need to open up to the West. Iran needs investment and expertise, more so now than before. Mehdi Karoubi, the former speaker of the Majles, said: “The 200,000 letters which Ahmadinejad receives on provincial trips are not love letters. They show the sheer number of problems which people have.”
The reformists have backed such statements, with Mousavi asking a number of questions regarding the oil income. As Iran’s prime minister from 1981-1989, Mousavi ran the country with $7 billion in yearly income. But Iran took in $60 billion last year, and Mousavi, along with his supporters, wants to know where the money went.
The reformists are also enraged by Ahmadinejad’s populist overtures — such as holding potato giveaways in order to garner votes. “Death to the government of potatoes!” has become a standard chant among anti-Ahmadinejad reformists.
So far, Ahmadinejad has focused on Iran’s achievements with its nuclear program and within its defense industry, which was able to successfully place a satellite in orbit. He has also focused his ire on the Khatami administration for suspending uranium enrichment in 2005, an agreement and rapprochement which Ahamadinejad found humiliating.
In a recent interview, Ahmadinejad additionally defended his Holocaust remarks: “The west uses the Holocaust as a tool to oppress others. We targeted the Holocaust and they can’t believe that we did this, because we targeted their weak spot. They can now see that Iran carries the same weight as the U.S. in international dealings.” To Ahmadinejad, breaking bonds and accords with the West is the best way to secure Iran’s future.
Although Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei determines the general direction of Iranian foreign policy, the U.S. would be forgiven for interpreting an Ahmadinejad loss as a sign that Khamenei is after a change in direction of Iran’s policies. If Ahmadinejad wins, we should expect the status quo or worse. Ahmadinejad could interpret a victory as a sign of stronger backing from Khamenei. Worse still, as Iranian law dictates that Ahmadinejad cannot stand for three consecutive elections, he will have little incentive to act in a less radical manner.
This article was published in PJM Media.
]]>The article below explores (for email recipients, if you can’t see the link please click on blue title above)
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/07/iran-election-us
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Sometimes news takes time to get out of Iran — particularly when it comes to internal strife in 
the upper political echelons. But eventually, major clashes leak out. This week the news emerged that Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the mayor of Tehran and Ahmadinejad’s main rival in the Osulgarayn (Principalist) movement, resigned from his post just before the end of the previous Persian calendar year — approximately March 18 or 19.
A number of days later, he was reinstated to his job after his resignation was rejected by senior officials, most likely the supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei.
The news was first published in the Tehran-based Jahan News, which is affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Information and Security, known by its Farsi acronym as VAVAK.
According to the report, the main reason for Ghalibaf’s resignation was the termination of supply of cement, primary materials, and tools required by the Tehran municipality for its subway project for the city of Tehran. This follows another controversial decision by the government to cut subsidized gasoline provided to the municipality’s cars. This decision forced the organization to purchase gas at market prices — six or seven times the price. These decisions first caused a number of senior municipality managers to resign, followed by the mayor himself.
The very fact that he took a step as extreme as resigning from his post is an indication of the intensity of the rivalry between him and Ahmadinejad. As mayor of Tehran, Ghalibaf depends on the national government, and Ministry of Interior in particular, to supply him with material and subsidized goods for city projects. He can’t just simply go out and buy them himself.
According to government regulations, the Ministry of Interior must approve every purchase and, in many cases, supply the goods as well as the funds. As president, Ahmadinejad wields power over the Ministry of Interior and other ministries that deal with Tehran Municipality. With such power, he can make life as easy and as difficult for Ghalibaf as he chooses.
Since 2005, Ahmadinejad has decided to do the latter.
Numerous projects have been delayed. A notable one was the supply of buses to the municipality for its Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) scheme, which Ghalibaf has been championing as a solution to Tehran’s traffic problems since late 2005. This notwithstanding the $600 million of approved funds, which the government refused to release to the municipality. Recently, Ghalibaf hit back, removing posters celebrating the 100th anniversary of the country’s oil industry, which showed Ahmadinejad standing in front of a refinery.
Ahmadinejad’s perception of Ghalibaf as a threat is quite accurate. There are many within the Iranian conservative movement who are concerned about the damage Ahmadinejad and his disastrous economic policies have caused their movement. They see Ghalibaf and his support for more moderate foreign and economic policies as hope for redemption.
There is also Ghalibaf’s military record as well, far more distinguished than that of Ahmadinejad. Ghalibaf was a senior commander in the Revolutionary Guards, and unlike Ahmadinejad, he has lost family (his brother) in war.
The resignation of Khatami also seems to have boosted Ghalibaf’s position. Some of Khatami’s supporters now back Mousavi (Khatami’s replacement). According to Shafaf News from Tehran, more than half of Khatami’s supporters now back Ghalibaf. One of the main reasons is thought to be because they see Ghalibaf as a good prospect, due to his good relations with the Revolutionary Guards and Khamenei himself.
Judging by Khatami’s resignation and Ghalibaf’s temporary resignation, the level of discord within the Iranian government is reaching a new level, and Ayatollah Khamenei knows this. This is why Khatami was most probably advised not to run: because the animosity which he creates between the conservatives would have created more division and infighting.
Ghalibaf’s resignation would have been another embarrassing blow, as he could have become the second senior official (after Larijani) to resign because of Ahmadinejad — hence the successful pressure on him to reverse his decision.
These developments show that President Obama’s policy of refusing to negotiate with Iran until after the presidential elections is on target. Once the elections are over and the dust settles, Washington will be in a much better position to deal with Tehran. Waiting until then will not be an easy decision, especially economically. According to a recent study by the CATO Institute, oil prices are set to rise again, which could force Americans to pay $3 or $4 for their gasoline at the pump.
This will provide Iran’s political hierarchy with more leverage at the negotiations.
However, negotiating before the elections could bolster Ahmadinejad and weaken the people of Iran, as well as politicians such as Ghalibaf who oppose the president. This must be avoided.
Hopefully, the political divisions and the internal enemies Ahmadinejad has created may do a much better job of bringing him down than the U.S. or Israel ever could.
This article originally appeared in PJM Media
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Iranian presidential race. It is understood that he will throw his support behind the candidacy of former Prime Minister Mir Hosein Mousavi.